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I. INTRODUCTION
As new forms of expression become commercially important, copyright law
is challenged to protect the exploitation of the technologies providing the new
medium. 1 The current technological challenge for American copyright law is
the National Information Infrastructure ("NII").
The National Information Infrastructure is best described as a network of
networks used to carry digital transmissions through thousands of computer
1 ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAvIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT INA NUTSHELL 283 (2d ed. 1990).
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networks using a common set of protocols. 2 The most common perception of
the NII is the Internet or Information Superhighway. The use of the term, National
Information Infrastructure, is meant not only to describe the current structure
of interconnected computer networks, but also to encompass the new forms
the Nil may take in the future.3
Currently, the Copyright Act 4 does not expressly include works created,
copied, transmitted, or performed on the NII. Yet, because of the relative ease
of copying works available on the NII and distributing them worldwide at little
or no cost, there is a need to adapt the Copyright Act to afford protection for
this new medium.
To meet this latest demand, in February, 1993, President Clinton formed the
Information Infrastructure Task Force 5 (hereinafter the "Working Group") "to
articulate and implement the Administration's vision for the National
Information Infrastructure."6 On September 5, 1995, the Working Group
released the White Paper,7 officially entitled, "Intellectual Property and the
National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on
Intellectual Property Rights."8 The White Paper addresses special intellectual
property concerns and issues raised by the development and use of the NII.9
2 See INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
31d. at 2, n.5.
4 Copyright Act of 1976,17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1996).
5 The Information Infrastructure Task Force is organized into three committees:
[1] the Telecommunications Policy Committee, which formulates
Administrative positions on relevant telecommunications issues;
[2] the Committee on Applications and Technologies, which
coordinates Administration efforts to develop, demonstrate and
promote applications of information technologies in key areas;
and [3] the Information Policy Committee, which addresses critical
information policy issues that must be dealt with if the NII is to be
fully deployed and utilized.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
61d.
7
"White Paper" is the term by which the report is commonly known. This term is
not to be confused with the "Green Paper," which was a preliminary draft of this report,
released July 7,1994.
8WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
9NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint Hearing on S. 1284 and H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary and
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings]
(prepared statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents And Trademarks, Patent And Trademark Office).
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The White Paper argues that transmissions and publications on the Nil
should be afforded copyright protection.10 It concludes that the current
Copyright Act can accommodate the technological changes, and that only
minor clarification and limited amendment is needed.11 The White Paper
unquestionably makes solid strides in the direction of affording copyright
protection to works transmitted on the NIL The primary problem with the
report, however, is its self-admitted conservatism in refusing to make
recommendations concerning issues that may prove to be a passing fad.12 The
Working Group's shortsightedness causes its recommendations either to be
overly-restrictive or to fail to meet the needs of authors currently using the NIL
The most glaring omission in the White Paper is its failure to make any
concrete recommendation regarding the liability of on-line service providers
for the copyright infringement of their subscribers.13 Because of the Working
Group's omission, the courts are left to determine the application of the
Copyright Act to the NII when they have traditionally been able to look toward
Congress for guidance.14
In this Note, analysis of the White Paper falls into three parts. First, a
summary of the relevant principles underlying copyright law, including a
survey of cases pertinent to an analysis of copyright protection on the NII, will
be presented. Second, the actual changes recommended by the White Paper
will be analyzed. Third, the White Paper's failure to set forth the law regarding
1OThe White Paper does not recommend any changes in patent or trademark law,
concluding that they are adequate to address the needs created by new technology
related to the Nil. WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 17, n.29.
11id.
121d. at 5-6.
[The White Paper] does not, however, provide all the answers. It
may not even present all of the questions. There is much that we
do not - and cannot - now know about how the NII will develop.
[Information] technology is advancing at such an incredible pace
that issues will certainly continue to arise in the future, perhaps
demanding more comprehensive legislation. However, because
there is much that we do know, the fact that future developments
will raise additional issues not currently ripe should not deter us
from addressing those that are.
Id.
13 0n-line service providers offer the link that gives the end-user access to the NI for
the purpose of interacting with, and using, the various elements related to the NI1.
On-line service providers may also be content providers. Content providers, such as
CompuServe, America Online, and Prodigy, offer large databases and other resources
to their subscribers. These resources are often used to access large information
databases, forums, chat rooms, and electronic mail. Significant differences exist among
on-line access providers as to what services each offers. See generally DICTIONARY OF
COMPUTER WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO TODAY'S COMPUTERS 195-96 (Revised ed. 1995)
[hereinafter DICTIONARY].
14See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,430-31 (1984).
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the potential liability of on-line service providers will be examined using
subsequent cases which have attempted to establish appropriate liability.
II. A REVIEW OF COPYRIGHT LAW PRINCIPLES
A. Copyright Principles Generally
Copyright protection finds its basis in the United States Constitution which
provides that Congress has the power to "promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries."15 Since George Washington
signed into law the first Copyright Act in 1790,16 copyright law has gone
15U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
As a result, the basis of protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory. Sony
Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 431 (citing Weaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661-62 (1834)). The
remedies for infringement "a re only those prescribed by Congress." Id. (citing Thompson
v. Hubbard, 131 U.S. 123,151, (1889)).
16 Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. See Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. 608
(1871). In Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), the United States Supreme Court
discussed the development of the Copyright Act prior to 1976.
The first congressional copyright statute, passed in 1790, governed
only maps, charts, and books. Act of May 31, 1790, c. [sic] 15, 1 Stat. 124.
In 1802, the Act was amended in order to grant protection to any person
"who shall invent and design, engrave, etch or work.., any historical or
other print or prints ..." Act of Apr. 29, 1802, c. [sic] 36, 2 Stat. 171.
Protection was extended to musical compositions when the copyright
laws were revised in 1831. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. [sic] 16,4 Stat. 436. In
1865, at the time when Mathew Brady's pictures of the Civil War were
attaining fame, photographs and photographic negatives were expressly
added to the list of protected works. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, c. [sic] 126, 13
Stat. 540. Again in 1870, the list was augmented to cover paintings,
drawings, chromos, statuettes, statuary, and models or designs of fine
art. Act of July 8,1870, c. [sic] 230,16 Stat. 198.
In 1909, Congress agreed to a major consolidation and amendment
of all federal copyright statutes .... The House Report on the proposed
bill specifically noted that amendment was required because "the re-
production of various things which are the subject of copyright has
enormously increased," and that the President has specifically recom-
mended revision, among other reasons, because the prior laws "omit[ted]
provision for many articles which, under modern reproductive
processes, are entitled to protection."
Since 1909, two additional amendments have been added. In 1912,
the list of categories in § 5 was expanded specifically to include motion
pictures. The House Report on the amendment noted:
"The occasion for this proposed amendment is the fact that the
production of motion-picture photoplays and motion pictures other
than photoplays has become a business of vast proportions. ... "
Finally, in 1971, § 5 was amended to include "sound recordings."
Congress was spurred to action by the growth of record piracy, which
was, in turn, due partly to technological advances.
Id. at 562, n.17 (citations omitted).
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through many revisions to keep up with technological advances. The most
recent major revision occurred in 1976,17 which gives us our present form of
copyright law.
There are three basic requirements of copyright protection: expression,
originality, and fixation. 18 The concepts of expression and originality stem from
the statutory qualification that protection only extend to "original works of
authorship."19 Copyright protection centers fundamentally upon the original
expression of an idea. '"The expression is the key because only the expression
is protected."20 The author must be expressing something that is original; the
expression must originate from within the author.21
The requirement of fixation means that to be afforded copyright protection,
the work must be fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 22 Protection then
automatically attaches to an eligible work at the moment of fixation.23 A work
is fixed "when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord ... is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."24
Once copyright is established, the holder is granted a bundle ofrights,25 which
together give the author control over his/her creation. The bundle of rights
applies to eight enumerated categories which generally include all written,
musical, and performance works.26 Copyright protection attaches to the
1717 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010.
1817 U.S.C. § 102 (1996).
19 1d. The statutory requirement is derived from Congress' limited Constitutional
authority to grant copyright protection to "authors" for their "writings." See U.S. CONST.,
art. L § 8, cl. 8.
20MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 288.
2117 U.S.C. § 102. This concept is different from patent law, under which, to be
eligible for patent protection, the work must be novel. Copyright makes no such
restriction. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 288-89.
22See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
231d.
2417 U.S.C. § 101 (1996).
25The bundle of rights generally give the copyright owner the exclusive right to do
and to authorize others: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) to perform the copyrighted
work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic works,
pantomimes, motion pictures, and other audiovisual works; and (5) to display the
copyrighted work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic
works, pantomimes, pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996).
2 6There are eight broad categories of protected works: (1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic,
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expression of the author. It does not extend to the idea or concept being
expressed,27 nor to works consisting entirely of information that is common
property and which contain no original authorship.28 And, as a matter of law,
copyright protection generally is not extended to the United States
Government.29
Copyright protection, once created, 30 endures for a term consisting of the life
of the author and fifty years after the author's death if the work was created
after January 1,1978.31 When the term of protection expires, the work becomes
part of the public domain.
After 1989, the use of copyright notice has become permissive rather than
required and as a result, no marking or symbol is required.32 Copyright
registration is simply a legal formality intended to make a public record of the
basic facts of a particular copyright and is not required33 for copyright
protection.34
and sculptured works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound
recordings; (8) architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
2717 U.S.C. § 102(b); see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539 (1985); Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
28 After copyright protection expires, works become common property. See infra note
31.
Examples of works having no original authorship, and thus no copyright
protection, are: standard calendars, height and weight charts, tape measures and rulers,
and lists or tables taken from public documents or other common sources. WHITE PAPER,
supra note 2, at 33.
2917 U.S.C. § 105 (1996). "Therefore, nearly all works of the U.S. Government -
including this Report - may be reproduced, distributed, adapted, publicly performed
and publicly displayed without infringement liability in the United States under its
copyright laws." WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 35.
30 A work is created when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first
time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it
that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that
time, and when the work has been prepared in different versions, each
version constitutes a separate work. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
3117 U.S.C. § 302 (1996). In the case of joint authorship, copyright protection lasts for
the life of the last surviving author plus fifty years. Id. Works made for hire as well as
anonymous and pseudonymous works, are protected for a term of either 75 years from
the year of first publication or 100 years from the date of creation, whichever is shorter.
Id. Works that were created but not published or registered for copyright before January
1,1978, have been automatically brought under the statue and are now given copyright
protection computed generally in the same fashion as those works created after 1978.
See Id.
3217 U.S.C. § 401 (1996).
3317 U.S.C. § 408 (1996).
34 However, under Sections 404 and 405 of the Copyright Act, registration may be
required to preserve the copyright on a work first published before March 1,1989, that
would otherwise be invalidated because the copyright notice was omitted from the
published copies or phonorecords, or the name or year was omitted, or certain errors
[Vol. 44:197
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss2/6
COPYRIGHT ON THE INTERNET
B. Fair Use
Probably the most important area of copyright law as it relates to the NII is
the doctrine of fair use.35 While this is a far from clear area of the law, fair use
can be generally seen as the use of a copyrighted work that is permitted without
permission of the copyright holder.36 The underlying premise of fair use is that
certain minor uses of a work should be permitted. 37 In determining what is fair
use, the courts look to four factors set out in Section 107 of the Copyright Act:
3 8
(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.3 9 All four
factors must be considered to determine whether a particular use is permissible
as fair use. Through a careful balancing of these four factors, courts determine
if there has been fair use. 4°
C. Remedies
Generally, anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner, as provided by the Copyright Act, may be liable for copyright
infringement. 41 Copyright infringement is determined independent of intent,
and innocent infringement is infringement nonetheless. 42 To be liable, the
taking or copying of the copyrighted work must be more than de minimus.
43
were made in the date. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 404-405 (1996).
Registration may be required for the enforcement of the holder's exclusive rights
in court. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 411-412 (1996); WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 61-62; see also 17
U.S.C. § 410 (1996) (stating that a certificate of copyright acts as prima facie evidence of
facts stated in the certificate regarding the copyrighted work).
3517 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).
36 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
475-77 (1984).
3 7Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985).
38 The four factors set forth in the Copyright Act are intended to be nonexclusive
factors which courts shall consider case by case in determining fair use. Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,844 (11 th Cir. 1990); see 17
U.S.C. § 107.
3917 U.S.C. § 107.
40 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
4117 U.S.C. § 501 (1996); see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
4 2 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1996).
43 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 102.
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The copying must be substantially similar to the original work and need not
be taken verbatim.44
The copyright holder may seek civil remedies such as a preliminary or
permanent injunction to restrain infringement. 45 At any time before the final
judgment in a copyright infringement action, the copyright owner may elect
to recover actual damages and the profits of the infringer, or be awarded
statutory damages.46
Additionally, a copyright infringer may be subject to criminal sanctions if
the infringement was willful and for the purposes of commercial gain.47 The
requirement of conduct being willful or for financial gain is often cited as one
of the problems with the current requirements for criminal liability.48
III. CLARIFICATION OF TERMS
Some conflict exists between the terminology used in the White Paper and
that used by the courts. The term National Information Infrastructure was created
by the Clinton administration. 49 This term is intended to be an all inclusive
reference embodying the various perceptions of what constitutes the
Information Superhighway, or the Internet. Understanding that these terms are
basically one and the same is important to the analysis of current case law
which speaks in terms of the Internet. Thus, a brief review of the more common
understanding of these terms is appropriate.
The term Internet is used to identify any collection of networks into a larger
Wide Area Network ('WAN").50 The popular understanding of the Internet
44See Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027,1030 (5th Cir. 1970)
("paraphrasing is equivalent to outright copying"), cert. den ied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Davis
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("paraphrasing
is tantamount to copying in copyright law").
45 See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1996).
4617 U.S.C. § 504.
4 7See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1996).
48 These requirements will be further discussed when considering the White Paper's
recommendations in this regard. See infra part V.E.
4 9 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
SORawn Shah, The Business of the Internet: An Introduction to the Internetfor Commercial
Organizations (last modified Apr., 1994)
<http://www.rtd.com/people/rawn/business.html>.
This document has been created entirely on the Intemet using the World Wide
Web and other tools. It is accessible at URL http://www.rtd.com.people/
rawn.business.html. The document expressly notes that this is its only medium of
publication. It serves as an excellent example of valuable copyrighted material that is
expressed in no form other than on the NI and one for which the changes to copyright
law needs to be addressed.
URL is an acronym for Uniform Resource Locator or Universal Resource Locator.
The URL is used to provide a location, or address, on the Internet. See DICTIONARY, supra
note 13, at 288.
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itself is as "a conglomerate of thousands of computer networks utilizing a
common set of technical protocols to create a worldwide communications
medium."51 The Internet is an outgrowth of a project from the 1970's called the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in the United States Department
of Defense.52 The ARPA network used standard protocols for communicating
with other computers on the network. These standards have been classified
together as the TCP/IP53 protocol, which is still the underlying protocol used
today.54 Most computers on the Internet act as either a bulletin board system
("BBS")5 5 for posting messages and information, or as an advanced database
providing interactive communications with anyone who accesses that
computer.
Quickly becoming the most popular mode of accessing the NII is the World
Wide Web ("WEB").56 'The World Wide Web is a hypertext based information
service. It provides access to multimedia and complex documents and
databases."57 The WEB provides a graphical interface for accessing the Internet.
Text, illustrations, sounds, and videos may all be accessed through the WEB.58
The WEB presents a challenge to copyright law because each illustration, text,
or sound may be dynamically linked to other servers on the NII even though
5 1Shah, supra note 50; see also DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 143.
52 Shah, supra note 50.
53 TCP/IP is an acronym for Transfer Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, which is a
group of protocols for network communications routing and data transfer developed
for the Internet. It is the accepted standard for UNIX-based operating systems and for
the Internet. DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 274.
5 4Shah, supra note 50.
Every computer that is technically in the Internet has an IP address which means it
must communicate with other systems using TCP/IP. See generally Id.
Currently, the Internet is estimated to have about 20 million users and the growth
rate is predicted to be approximately 10% every month. Id.
55 A bulletin board system ("BBS") is an electronic communication system that allows
users to leave messages, review messages, play games, and upload and download
software. A BBS may be accessed either through private call-in access or through the
Internet if the BBS provides a connection. See DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 31; see also
Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 683 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
56The World Wide Web is commonly referred to as the WEB or the WWW.
5 7Shah, supra note 50; see also DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 303.
Hypertext is a format for presenting text that is cross-referenced through
hyperlinks to other text, graphics, sound, or video. DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 135.
Hypertext markup language is the computer language used on the WEB to format text and
provide links between resources. Id. at 134. Http is an acronym for hypertext transfer
protocol which is used on the WEB to govern the transfer of data. Id.
58 Shah, supra note 50.
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they appear to be originating from the server the user is accessing.59 Dynamic
links on a WEB page could be used to display, copy, distribute, or perform
works elsewhere on the Internet without the copyright owner's knowledge. 60
IV. NII COPYRIGHT CASES LEADING UP TO THE WHITE PAPER
The White Paper relies primarily on three recent decisions relating to
copyright infringement of digital works.
The first decision, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,61 was rendered
in 1992. This case is significant because of its holding in regard to copying
information into a computer's RAM. 62 MAI Systems Corp. ("MAI") was a
manufacturer of computer equipment and the software to run the equipment.63
Peak Computer ("Peak") was a company that maintained computer systems
for its clients. More than fifty percent of Peak's business consisted of
maintaining systems manufactured by MAI.64 When computers manufactured
by MAI needed repair, it was customary for Peak to load the MAI system
software, supplied with the computer purchased by Peak's client, into the
computer's RAM. 65 MAI contended that when Peak loaded the copyrighted
software into the computer's RAM, Peak made copies in contravention of
MAI's license agreement which did not allow the copying of its software by
third parties such as Peak.66
The Ninth Circuit held that the "loading of copyrighted computer software
from a storage medium (hard disk, floppy disk, or read only [sic] memory) into
the memory of a central processing unit ('CPU') causes a copy to be made."67
59Simply by clicking on a link, a user can access a completely different server that is
providing related information. In some cases, the actual illustrations that appear on the
user's computer screen appear as if they came from the primary site being accessed.
6OFor instance, in the recently decided Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), access to the bulletin
board system that contained the published and unpublished works of the founder of
the Church of Scientology could have been obtained through a direct link on any
computer having a WEB page on the NII.
61MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
6 2RAM is an acronym for random-access memory, the main memory of a computer.
RAM is the volatile memory on a computer used to temporarily store information for
extremely fast access. DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 234-35.
63MAI Systems Corp., 991 F.2d at 513.
64Id. MAI was also in the business of servicing its own equipment. This action arose
after several of MAI's employees left to beemployed byPeak. With them, theemployee's
brought some clients to Peak who had been serviced by MAI. Id.
651d. at 517.
661d.
67MAISystems Corp., 991 F.2d 511,518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
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Copies made into a computer's RAM are sufficiently fixed to qualify as a copy
under the Copyright Act.68
The second case of importance is Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena.69
Defendant Frena operated a subscription bulletin board service (BBS) which
was available to subscribers through telephone access.70 Once logged onto
Frena's BBS, subscribers could view or download any of 170 computerized
photographs which were copyrighted by Playboy Enterprises ("Playboy"). 71
The photographs were uploaded by Frena's subscribers to the BBS. 72
The district court held that because Frena supplied the product containing
the copyrighted works, he was liable for the public display and distribution of
the photographs in violation of Playboy's copyright.73 The court determined
that it was inconsequential that Frena did not make the copies himself. 74
Frena defended that the maintaining of copies of the photographs on his BBS
should qualify as a fair use.75 When the court balanced the four factors used to
evaluate whether the posting of the photographs qualified as a fair use,76 it
found that Frena's use did not qualify.77 Because Frena's bulletin board wasfor
profit, the court concluded that there was a presumption that the use was for a
commercial purpose.78 The entertainment aspect of the photographs and the
fact that the taking required the photographs be used in their entirety, both
weighed against Frena.79 Most important, however, was the court's finding
that if there is unrestricted widespread distribution through the NII, there
would be a substantial adverse impact on Playboy's market for the
photographs.80 Important to the court was not the limited scope of Frena's BBS,
but the potential harm in the aggregate if the use was permitted.81
68 d. at 519. This holding might be extended to mean that since a WEB page must be
loaded into the accessing computer's RAM to be viewed, a copy would be made. WHITE
PAPER, supra note 2, at 65.
69 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).




74 Playboy Enters., Inc., 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
751d. at 1557; see supra part ll.B.
7617 U.S.C. § 107.
77 Playboy Enters., Inc., 839 F. Supp. at 1556.
78 d. at 1558. The court relied on Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that every commercial use is presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the copyright).
79Playboy Enters., Inc., 839 F. Supp. at 1558.
80d
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The third principal case involving the copyright protection of digital works
is Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia.82 Sega Enterprises ("Sega") makes video games
which it distributes on read-only memory cartridges that could be accessed by
game machines also manufactured by Sega.83 Maphia operated a computer
bulletin board that was linked to a system of other bulletin boards.84 Maphia
encouraged his subscribers to upload entire Sega games to his bulletin board
system and then sometimes would charge a fee, or would barter, for their
download to other subscribers. 85 To copy the games, Maphia sold an electronic
duplicator so that subscribers could copy the games and upload them to the
bulletin board.86 Among other things, Sega claimed that Maphia's actions were
in violation of its copyright.87
The Sega court concluded that Maphia's actions constituted contributory
infringement because he induced, caused, or materially contributed to the
infringing conduct of another.88 The copying of the computer programs was a
prima facie infringement of Sega's copyright.89 Similar to the Playboy decision,
the court in Sega found that there was not a fair use defense because of the
commercial nature of the bulletin board and the likelihood of market harm,
should such use become widespread on the NII.90
V. THE WHITE PAPER'S RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations of the Working Group fall within six broad
categories: 91 (1) the transmission of copies and phonorecords; (2) public
performance right for sound recordings; (3) library exemptions; (4)
reproduction for the visually impaired; (5) criminal offenses; and (6)
technological protection and copyright management information. 92 Each of
these broad areas is discussed and explained in detail, usually with only minor
811d. at 1559.
82 Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).




87 Sega Enters., Ltd., 857 F. Supp. 679, 681 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
88 1d. at 688 (citing Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987)).
89 1d. (citing MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994)).
90 1d. at 688.
91 The premise of the White Paper is that the Copyright Act is fundamentally sound
and only needs to be modified to adapt to the new demands created by the widespread
use of the Nil. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 17.
92 Actually, technological protection and copyright management information are
discussed separately in the White Paper, but because they strive for a similar legal
[Vol. 44:197
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss2/6
COPYRIGHT ON THE INTERNET
changes recommended. A significant exception is the recommendation for the
creation of a new Chapter of the Copyright Act for technological protection. At
the end of the discussion, the Working Group proposed model legislation to
implement its recommendations. 93
A. The Transmission of Copies and Phonorecords
The first set of recommendations is probably the least controversial94 and is
intended primarily to recognize that works that are transmitted over the NII
should be afforded copyright protection. The Working Group suggests that the
Copyright Act be amended "to expressly recognize that copies or phonorecords
of works can be distributed to the public by transmission, and that such
transmissions fall within the exclusive distribution of the copyright owner."95
To accomplish its goal, the Working Group recommended the changing of two
key definitions; transmit and publication.
The word transmit is to be amended to include the definition of a
transmission of a reproduction.% The current Copyright Act only defines what
it means to transmit a performance or display.97 It does not recognize
distribution over the NII, and the proposed amendment is intended to correct
purpose, this Note discusses them together. See Id. at 230, 235.
93A sample bill is reproduced both in amendment and statutory mark-up form. See
Id. at app. 1 (Amending Title 17 of the United States Code).
Both the United States House of Representatives and the Senate have introduced
bills that are substantially similar to that recommended in the White Paper: H.R. 2441,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 1284, 104th Cong., 1st Sess (1995). Both bills and the
recommended legislation in the White Paper contain the same format and sections.
Therefore, a cite to a section in the White Paper's model legislation will parallel that in
H.R. 2441 and S. 1284. Note that since the 104th Congress has ended, these bills are
effectively dead and will have to be reintroduced by the 105th Congress, thus leaving
open the possibility that their content may differ from that recommended in the White
Paper. Only citation to the White Paper's recommended Bill will be made in this Note
to limit confusion.
94 Literary comment and congressional testimony generally support the purpose of
the Working Group's changes and the definitional amendments are well supported. For
example, the U.S. Copyright Office, which offered criticisms for all other areas of the
recommendations, stated their approval to the Working Group's recommendations for
amending the definitions. "The Copyright Office supports all of these [definitional]
amendments in their entirety. In our view, they represent a helpful clarification of
existing law at the time of rapid technological change." Hearings, supra note 9, at 44
(prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Registerof Copyrights and Associate Librarian
for Copyright Services).
95 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 213.
96Id. at 217. The proposed legislation changes the current definition of transmit by
adding at the end of the definition, 'To transmit a reproduction is to distribute it by any
device or process whereby a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond the place
from which it was sent." WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at app. 1 § 1(b)(2).
9717 U.S.C. § 101.
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this shortcoming. Since the courts are already using the term transmit as a
means of describing distribution on the NII, 98 the Working Group's
recommended change to the word transmit will serve to clarify its meaning for
future adjudication.
The definitional change to publication99 follows naturally from the
recognition that works can be transmitted across the NIL Under current
copyright law, there is a question as to whether the display of copyrighted
material on the NII is actually a publication, because, while millions of people
may view a work, it may not actually change hands, which is a basis of
publication. 100 "Thus, a work that is only displayed or performed via the Nil
would not be considered published. . . because a material object - a copy of
the work - does not change hands."101 For instance, when viewing a WEB
page,102 a copyrighted work may be displayed without actually being
transferred into the permanent storage of the accessing computer.
To accommodate this discrepancy, the Working Group recommended that
the definition of publication be amended to recognize that a work may be
published through the distribution of copies to the public by transmission.103
Again, the definitional amendment of publication seems appropriate because
it reflects the definitional standards currently being used by the courts.10 4
Even though these definitional changes are largely uncontroversial, they do
fall short in one regard. There is a question as to when a transmission would
implicate the right to public performance as well as reproduction.10 5 For
instance, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena106 the court held that storage on the
defendant's system of infringing copies and the retransmission to other servers
98See generally Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
99The proposed legislation suggests the current law be amended by striking "or by
rental, lease, or lending" in the first sentence and insert "by rental, lease, or lending, or
by transmission" WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at app. 1 § 1(b)(1).
lOOId. at 218.
10l1d.
102 See supra, at part mII (discussion of the World Wide Web).
103 WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 219; see Id. at app. 1 § 2(b)(1).
104 See generally Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
Further, the Working Group recognized that because the Ni is a world-wide
network, the Copyright Act must clearly set forth those works which are imported into
the United States via the NII which would be subject to United States' copyright laws.
It, therefore, recommended that the import provisions of the Copyright Act be amended
to recognize that importation may be by transmission. WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 221;
see Id. at App. 1 § 2(c).
105 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 46 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
106Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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was not a direct violation of the right to reproduce a work, but was a violation
of the copyright holder's distribution right.107 However, because of the
technological requirement that to display the work, it must necessarily be
stored in the user's computer RAM108 or on his or her hard drive, a copy is also
being sent and, therefore, has in essence been copied. 109 Thus, the work could
be actually copied, distributed, and publicly performed from one viewing of a
transmission. Distinguishing between public performance and copying might
present problems for both licensing and in determining which of the copyright
holder's exclusive rights are actually implicated and to what extent. 110
B. Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings
Sound recordings can be sent digitally across the NIL and even listened to
through the NIT. In a typical situation, a person could connect to a World Wide
Web site and download a song or sample of a sound that could then be played
through the user's sound-capable computer.111 The Working Group recognized
that transmission of sound recording over the NII may be an important
compliment to current forms of distribution for phonorecords and may, in fact,
replace some existing forms.112 The White Paper, therefore, recommends a
change in the definition of transmit to include the transmitting of
phonorecords. 113
Sound recordings, however, stand on a different ground than other
copyrighted works because the author does not generally exercise a right to
public performance. 114 This anomaly in the law is generally accepted by the
recording artists because of the free advertising artists receive when their
phonorecords are publicly played.115 The Working Group believes that there
is an inequity in copyright law created by this anomaly and that "the copyright
owners of sound recordings should be able to decide for themselves, as do all
10 71d. at 1557.
108 See supra note 62 (definition of RAM).
109 See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994).
110See Hearings, supra note 9, at 46 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
111A good example of a WEB site that performs music is maintained by the Rock &
Roll Hall of Fame & Museum in Cleveland, Ohio. It can be accessed at Rock & Roll Hall
ofFameand Museum (visited Oct. 6,1996) <http://www.rockhall.com> (modified daily).
112WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 221.
113See Id. at app. 1 § 2(b)(2).
1141d. at 224-225. This anomaly in the law is not actually in the Code itself. Technically
sound recording artists are afforded the same exclusive public performance rights
granted in Section 106(4) as all other copyright holders. However, the common practice
is that such display rights are not enforced. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
115WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 224-225.
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other copyright owners, if 'free advertising' is sufficient compensation for the
use of their works."116
The Working Group's call for performance rights to be afforded to the
creators of sound recordings in the same manner as they are to all other
copyright holders is consistent with the current state of technology. Because
the transmission is in digital form, the user who is accessing the digital
recording not only receives the performance, but also a copy of the actual work.
With the millions of users on the NII, a work could conceivably be distributed
digitally an unlimited number of times. Having sounds transmitted over the
NII means that display rights necessarily go hand in hand with distribution
rights. To date, there appear to be no cases involving infringement of the
distribution right of sound recordings over the NII that were not specifically
stored for downloading. 117 However, as technology continues to increase so
that users can easily and inexpensively convert digital recordings to more
transportable media, such as cassette tapes, issues may arise not only as to
whether an artist's display rights are being violated, but also as to whether his
or her distribution right is also violated.
C. Library Exemptions
The White Paper proposes to expand the library exemption set forth in
Section 108118 of the Copyright Act to accommodate digital copies that might
be kept in a library's digital holdings.U9 The proposed recommendations
would permit libraries to maintain three digital copies120 of a work for the
purpose of preservation and/or replacement of a published work. The present
library exemption limits the making of copies for archival purposes to facsimile
reproductions. 121 Thus, in the most basic form, the Working Group's
recommendation to expand Section 108 is consistent with the Section's purpose
of allowing libraries special exemptions to save and to preserve the original
published work.122
There is some question, however, as to whether allowing three copies is
appropriate. 123 Currently, even though there is a statutory limit of one copy,
1161d. at 224.
117Compare Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 29,1993) (class action settlement); see infra part VI.A.
11817 U.S.C. § 108 (1996).
119 WHIM PAPER, supra note 2, at 226-27.
120 The current law only allows for the maintenance of no more than one copy or
phonorecord at a time. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
1211d.
12 2 1d.
123 Hearings, supra note 9, at 47-48 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
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the practice among libraries is to make three copies for archival purposes: one
copy is made available to the public; one copy is a back-up copy; and the third
is the doomsday copy stored in an off-site, secure location.1 24 Presumably, the
same process would be required for proper archival of digital works.
The Working Group recognizes the need to store more than one copy,
especially when considering the potential volatility of digital recordings. Their
amendment, however, increases the exemption for both digital and non-digital
works.125 While the proposed amendment codifies industry practice, it may in
fact result in libraries increasing their copying for archival purposes. Thus, the
proposed amendment might better serve its purpose if it is changed to apply
expressly to digital copies.126
Additionally, the Working Group recommends that libraries be permitted to
omit the notice of copyright if that notice does not appear on the copy or
phonorecord reproduced. 127 This change is intended to reflect the recent
changes in the Copyright Act that do not require that works give notice of their
copyright protection. 128 This amendment is not needed because of the recent
technological advances brought on by the NII, but instead brings consistency
to the Copyright Act. Yet, if made into law, whether it is meant to apply
exclusively to digital works should be clarified.
D. Reproduction for the Visually Impaired
The Working Group proposes an amendment to the Copyright Act that
would create a new Section 108(A) for the purpose of taking advantage of the
benefits new digital technology could offer to the visually impaired. 129 The
12 4 1d.
125 The proposed legislation amends the number of copies permitted within the library
exemption by deleting "one copy or phonorecord" and inserting in lieu thereof "three
copies or phonorecords." WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at app. 1 § 3(a)(1).
126 There appears to be some fear of disturbing the current practice among libraries
and it is thought to be advisable that the changes be expressly limited to digital copying,
which is the purpose and subject of the amendments. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 47-48
(prepared statementof Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian
for Copyright Services).
1 2 7 WH1TE PAPER, supra note 2, at 227.
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 401.
129 The Nil offers real opportunities to many visually impaired people
to participate in learning, communication and discourse to a greater
extent than when only conventional modes of communication are
available. With the aid of software and computer equipment that is
widely available, people now have the capacity to view text on CD-ROM
on screen in a "large-type" format even if the publisher did not include
such a feature, but the publication and distribution of large-type editions
remains very important. To ensure fair access to all manner of printed
materials, it is necessary to amend the copyright law.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 227.
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proposed Section 108(A) provides an exemption for the visually impaired by
allowing non-profit organizations to reproduce and distribute, at a reasonable
cost, "a Braille, large type, audio or other edition of a previously published
literary work in a form intended to be perceived by the visually impaired" if
the copyright owner has not entered into the market for such editions within
one year after the work's first publication. 130 While this exemption may seem
well intentioned and reasonable on its face, it is not very well thought-out.
There are several questions raised by the proposed legislation. First, the
proposed amendment does not clearly grant access to digitized versions of
works. Where the Working Group has gone to exhaustive lengths to include
the ability to transmit works in digitized form in the definitions,
131 it is
surprisingly left out here.132
Second, the use of the term visually impaired is inconsistent with other federal
laws providing access to works for this audience, as well as Section 710 of the
Copyright Act, which utilizes the term blind and physically handicapped to define
the class eligible for benefits.133 The White Paper's inconsistent terminology
will only cause confusion.
Third, the one year waiting period 134 may severely lessen the value of the
exemption. Blind and physically handicapped readers have the same interest
in obtaining prompt and timely publications as do non-handicapped
individuals.
Fourth, currently, none of the major government and non-profit producers
of alternative versions for the blind and physically handicapped readers
prepares materials in large print. 135 There is a growing commercial market for
13 0The proposed Section 108A, 'Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Reproduction for
the Visually Impaired," states as follows:
Notwithstanding the provision of section 106, it is not an infringement
of copyright for a non-profit organization to reproduce and distribute
to the visually impaired, at cost, a Braille, large type, audio or other
edition of a previously published literary work in a form intended to
be perceived by the visually impaired, provided that, during a period
of at least one year after the first publication of a standard edition of
such work in the United States, the owner of the exclusive right to
distribute such work in the United States has not entered the market
for editions intended to be perceived by the visually impaired.
WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at app. 1 § 3(b).
131 The definitional changes intend to clarify that digital works transmitted over the
NIH are afforded copyright protection. The White Paper is inconsistent in not expressly
including works transmitted in digital form. See supra note 130 (proposed amendment
for the visually impaired).
1321d.
133See 17 U.S.C. § 710 (1996).
134 See supra note 130 (proposed amendment for the visually impaired).
13SHearings, supra note 9, at 50 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
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the production of such works, which are enjoyed by a large cross-section of
readers, both handicapped and non-handicapped. 136 The inclusion of only
non-profit groups seems inappropriate.
Fifth, the amendment does not clarify what types of organizations should
be counted as non-profit.137 Currently, more than 95% of the reading materials
produced for the blind and physically handicapped are produced by the
government.138 Under the proposed amendment, however, they may not be
included as a non-profit organization. The Working Group should have either
included the United States Government expressly or by definition. 139
The proposed amendment seems to be inadequate and inconsistent with the
general thoroughness displayed elsewhere in the White Paper. The only
possible explanation for this section is found in a footnote140 which indicates
that the visually impaired were the only users with a disability who provided
comments or testimony concerning a need for a narrow exemption. With this
in mind, it appears that the Working Group has simply attempted to appease
a limited group of individuals who spoke up. The result is an amendment that
raises more questions than it answers, including the question of how well the
report was researched.
E. Criminal Offenses
There is a gap in the Copyright Act's ability to reach criminal offenders. To
be criminally liable, one must infringe "a copyright willfully and for purposes
of commercial advantage or private financial gain."141 The gap in the current
statute is that an offender may willfully infringe upon a copyright, even to a
large scale, destroying any commercial market for a copyrighted work, and not
incur any criminal liability if he or she does not do it for a commercial
advantage. This situation occurred in the context of the NII in the case of United
States v. LaMacchia.142
1361d.
137See supra note 130 (proposed amendment for the visually impaired).
138Hearings, supra note 9, at 50 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
139See Id.
140In a footnote, the White Paper stated:
The visually impaired were the only users with a disability who provided
comments or testimony concerning a need for a narrow exemption to
ensure the availability of literary works in a usable form. By its recom-
mendation of such an exemption for the visually impaired, the Working
Group does not intend to dismiss the possibility that other disabled users
may have needs of which it has not been made aware and, therefore,
has not considered.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 228, n. 562.
141 17 U.S.C. § 506(A).
142 United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
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In LaMacchia, a twenty-one year old student at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology ("MIT") who was an alleged computer hacker, used MIT's
computer network to gain entrance to the Internet. LaMacchia used
pseudonyms and an encrypted address to set up an electronic bulletin board.
He then encouraged his correspondents on the Internet to upload popular
copyrighted software applications, which he transferred to a second BBS143 for
downloading. LaMacchia successfully set up an international-scale copying
and distribution system for commercially distributed and copyrighted
software.144 His scheme allegedly caused losses in excess of one million dollars
for the copyright holders. 145 Unfortunately, because LaMacchia could not be
shown to have sought personally to profit from the scheme to defraud, he was
not convicted under the wire fraud statute146 nor under the Copyright Act.
In the White Paper, the Working Group embraced a comment by the court
in LaMacchia that criminal and civil liability should attach to multiple
infringements absent a commercial motive.147 The LaMacchia court, however,
refused to attach such liability concluding that there is a substantial case history
in which the courts have looked to Congress to mandate the copyright laws.148
From the LaMacchia court's comment, the Working Group sought to institute a
recommendation that criminal liability should attach to willful copyright
violation even absent a commercial purpose.149
What the Working Group did not comment on was a different suggestion by
the LaMacchia court. The court commented that expansion of criminal liability
would serve to criminalize the conduct of not only persons like
LaMacchia, but also the myriad of home computer users who succumb
143 See supra note 55 (definition of a BBS).
144 LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 536.
145Id. at 537.
146 1d. at 542.
Potential liability existed for non-disclosure, but since no fiduciary duty existed
between LaMacchia and copyright holders, no independent statutory duty of disclosure
existed. Id.
147 WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 229.
Criminal as well as civil penalties should probably attach to willful,
multiple infringements of copyrighted software even absent a commercial
motive on the part of the infringer. One could envision ways that the
copyright law could be modified to permit such prosecution. But, "[iut
is the legislature, not the Court which is to define a crime, and ordain
its punishment."
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 545 (citing Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207,214 (1985)).
148 Id. at 543-545.
149 WHrTE PAPER supra note 2, at 229.
The Working Group generally supports the amendments to the copyright law and
criminal law which sets out sanctions for criminal liability as set forth in Senate Bill 1122,
introduced in the 104th Congress by Senators Leahy and Feingold. Id.; see S. 11 22,104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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to the temptation to copy even a single software program for private
use. It is not clear that making criminals of a large number of
consumers of computer software is a result that even the software
industry would consider desirable.
150
A general fear exists that tighter copyright laws and a stricter interpretation
of fair use will criminalize the daily activities of everyone who uses the Internet
to send their electronic messages. 151 The underlying premise is that most users
will be unable, or at least unwilling, to scrutinize their electronic messages for
infringing materials. Indeed, enforcement of the letter of the law as proposed in
the White Paper might succeed in criminalizing such behavior. The question
lies, however, in how the Working Group's proposal of a $5,000 minimum retail
value for criminal liability would be imposed. 152
To answer the fear of criminalizing what is commonly seen as normal
behavior, there are at least two solutions, one of which may have been
effectively provided for by the White Paper's proposal of a $5,000 minimum.
The first possibility can only be acted upon by Congress. Instead of simply
having the willfulness requirement applied to every case of copyright
infringement, the statute should have a section for willfulness without commercial
intent as a crime that requires a certain minimum distribution, or having a
substantial153 economic harm. Then, the substantial economic harm could be
defined as having a minimum threshold of $5,000.
The purpose of including a separate section for willfulness without criminal
intent is that it leaves the possibility that criminal liability could be imposed as
it would be under the current law. In other words, if the infringement is willful
and for a commercial purpose, criminal liability would be imposed
independent of the actual economic damage, even if less than $5,000.154 The
purpose of this distinction is that there are instances where the entire
commercial market is less than an arbitrary, unchanging amount of $5,000. For
example, in a setting where the copyrighted work is for a limited audience,155
150LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 544.
151'I was appalled to discover that my attaching a small electronic copy of an article
to a memo and sending it to a friend is considered some sort of evil deed and new, tight
copyright laws will make that illegal- a terror that must be stopped. Horror of horrors!"
John C. Dvorak, Are You an Electronic Criminal?, PC MAGAZINE, Oct. 25, 1994, at 93.
152 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 229.
153The prosecution should have to demonstrate that the copyright holder's potential
commercial harm is materially affected. Unfortunately, the interpretation of a material
harm would be left to the determination of the courts much in the same way it
determines the fourth factor of fair use. See supra part II.B.
154 If there were intent to take commercial advantage of a copyrighted work, the
infringer would be criminally liable independent of the commercial damage already
done.
15 5A commonly encountered example of a limited audience would be found in an
academic environment. A writing that might have limited value to a specific academic
community (or even something as simple as a T-shirt), could be completely infringed
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the law would protect against the taking of the entire market while supporting
the incentive to create useful arts for the smaller market.156
The setting of an arbitrary minimum does not promote the constitutional
purpose of copyright law in protecting useful arts at all levels because there
could be material infringement causing damages less than $5,000. If willfulness
is punished when present, but a threshold minimum is required when
willfulness is absent, fears would be eased because the innocent act of sending
electronic messages over the NII would not be criminalized. As a result,
electronic messaging across the NIl would still be encouraged, while at the
same time the principles of copyright would be protected.
The second possibility is simply to amend fair use157 by exempting the
distribution of copyrighted works of a limited value for the purpose of personal
communication. As the law of fair use now stands, it might very well allow for
slight infringements such as the attaching of a copyrighted work to an
electronic message for the limited purpose of passing information along to the
person receiving the message.158 But, without amending the law there will
always be questions as to what constitutes a commercial use and what would
be a substantial impairment of future market value.159 Congress, therefore,
could eliminate the potential confusion and the potential flood of court cases
by setting forth what is acceptable in electronic messaging.160 By limiting the
number of recipients and the scope of the taking, copyright law would spell
out what is acceptable behavior in the NIl. With the use of the NII surpassing
20 million users in the United States alone,161 an amendment to fair use
specifically setting forth the allowance for electronic messaging on the Nil
would be appropriate.
F. Technological Protection and Copyright Management Information
The primary purpose of the Working Group's last two recommendations is
to promote the publication of copyrighted information on the NII by giving the
with an amount less than $5,000 because of the limited market for the work.
156The underlying purpose of copyright law is to encourage the useful arts which is
stated in the Constitution. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. If the basis of criminal law is to
punish the intent, i.e., mens rea, then attaching criminal liability for the criminal intent
is consistent with criminal law principles and would serve to encourage the purpose
expressed in the Constitution of protecting the useful arts at all economic levels. Id.
157See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
158 The lack of a commercial nature and impairment of the potential commercial
market would likely classify such a communication as fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107;
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
15917 U.S.C. § 107.
160A fifth standard of fair use could be added exempting limited electronic messaging.
See Id.
161Shah, supra note 50.
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copyright holder adequate protection against infringement. 162 To accomplish
this goal, the Working Group proposes the addition of a Chapter 12 to the
Copyright Act which would be composed of two sections. The first section
would prohibit technology that could be used to bypass any encryption or
other technology used to protect the copyrighted work, and the second section
would prohibit the disturbance or alteration of copyright management
information 163 associated with the copyrighted work.164 The result of reading
these two provisions together is that the copyright holder is offered protection
under the Copyright Act and may control access to his or her copyrighted work
on the NIl. The underlying purpose of the revisions is to make copyright
information easily available to users of the work to discourage copyright
violation due to an inability to discover the protection of the work.165
The first area of legislation builds off the basic assumption that technological
means of protecting copyright will be used to prevent unwanted access to the
author's work.166 The Working Group concluded that effective protection of
copyright on the NII will have to be accomplished by a combination of both
law and technology.167 Technological protection is needed to meet the
challenges presented in the digital environment by the ease, speed, and
accuracy of copying at multiple, anonymous locations. 168
The recommendation essentially prohibits the use of any technology whose
"primary purpose is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise
circumvent, without authority of the copyright owner or the law, any process,
treatment, mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the violation of any
16 2WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 230, 235.
16 3The White Paper defines copyright management information as:
Under the proposed amendment, copyright management information
is defined as the name and other identifying information of the author
of a work, the name and other identifying information of the copyright
owner, terms and conditions for uses of the work, and such other infor-
mation as the Register of Copyrights may prescribe by regulation - to
provide adequate flexibility in the future.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 235.
164 See Id. at app. 1 § 4 (amending Title 17 of United States Code by adding Chapters
1201-1204) (for ease of reference, citations to chapters 1201-1204 of § 4 of the bill will be
cited to the individual proposed chapter instead of the broad section head).
165
"If obtaining [copyrighted] information is difficult, people are more likely to forego
the Nl's benefits or resort to unauthorized uses." Hearings, supra note 9, at 52 (prepared
statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for
Copyright Services).
166 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 230.
16 71d.
168Hearings, supra note 9, at 51 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
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of the exclusive rights under Section 106."169 Such protection is not
unprecedented under the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act already protects
sound recordings and musical works by prohibiting the circumvention of any
digital protection inhibiting the making of copies.170 The extension, thus, is a
logical one for works that can be digitally altered, such as those available on
the NI. The primary difficulty with this legislation is the question of what
should be considered the primary purpose of the device.
The Supreme Court has already set a precedent by holding that works that
might have the ability to infringe upon the exclusive rights of copyright holders
may be imported and sold in the United States if the primary purpose is for
non-infringing, legitimate purposes.17 1 Additionally, the Working Group
noted that liability will not be imposed if an individual uses technology to
circumvent digital copyright protection if it is permitted at law.172 Further,
questions arise as to what should result when a work is in the public domain
or can be legitimately used, but such use is not possible because of technological
roadblocks.
There is also a question of who may bring an action for a violation of the
proposed Chapter 12.173 The proposed legislation states that anyone who has
been injured may bring the action.174 This potentially means that persons other
than the copyright holder may bring the action. This could result in anyone
who holds a license, or some limited use of the copyright, could bring an action
in addition to the copyright holder.175 Instead of one case for copyright
infringement, there would be the possibility of many suits, all for the same
infringement. This is most likely not desired by anyone involved and would
serve to contribute to our already overcrowded court system.
With the use of technological protection also comes the problem of limiting
the fair use of the work because of the inability to access the copyrighted work.
The Working Group considered the argument that fair use would be impeded
with the use of technological protection techniques. 17 6 It rationalized this
169WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 230.
17017 U.S.C. § 1002.
171Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
172 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 231. For example, under the Working Group's
recommendation, if the purpose of the circumvention was for a fair use, there would be
no violation. Id.
173Hearings, supra note 9, at 51 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
174
"Any person injured by a violation of Sec. 1201 or 1202 may bring a civil action in
an appropriate United States district court for such violation." WHITE PAPER, supra note
2, at app. 1 § 1203.
175 See Hearings, supra note 9, at 51 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
176 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 231-232.
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compromise by noting that such a limitation is a necessary evil and that it
would be acceptable for an individual to use a circumvention device because
of the lawful purpose.177
If works are going to be protected through encryption or other techniques,
one of the necessary compromises is that the works will be limited for other
purposes. But, the Working Group does not require that some protection
technique be used, it only permits it.178 The courts support the principle of
copyright law that the owner of a copyright has no obligation to make his work
available to the public.179 The copyright holder, therefore, has the same choice
he or she has always had. The new encryption techniques are only being
protected by the Copyright Act because they are seen by the Working Group
as the only form of protecting work distributed over the NII.180 Since
encryption is the primary means, if not the only means, of protection, the law
should support it in the same way it has done for phonorecords.18 1
Once the Working Group provided for the protection of works on the NII, it
focused on how copyright should be identified in digital works. 18 2 To
accomplish its goal, the Working Group recommends that copyright holders
utilize various means of providing notice through the use of copyright
management information.183 The purpose of supplying such information is so
that the public may gain access to, and enjoy, works while respecting the rights
of authors and other owners. 184 Additionally, the best interest of the copyright
holder demands easy access to information because without relative ease in
obtaining such copyright information, people are more likely to forego the
NII's benefits and resort to unauthorized uses.185 Any violation or alteration
of the copyright management information would result in criminal liability.186
177d.
178Id.
179 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
18OSee WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 230-34.
181See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1996).
182While notice of copyright is optional under the current law, because of the
potentially restrictive means for viewing and obtaining protected work through the Nil,
there had to be a means of easily identifying the copyright holder so that permission
could be obtained. WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 235-36; see 17 U.S.C. § 408.
183
"Copyright management information will serve as a kind of license plate for a work
on the information superhighway, from which a user may obtain important information
about the work." WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 235.
184Id.
18SHearings, supra note 9, at 52 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services).
To continue to make copyright information easy to access and gain permission to
use the work, the U.S. Copyright Office is developing an electronic registration and
recordation system with a rights management component that will allow such
information to be collected and disseminated electronically. Id.
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This final recommendation is not novel. In fact, there is considerable, and
possibly even confusing, overlap with current sections of the Copyright Act.
The overlap occurs with Section 506(C) which makes it unlawful for any person
to, "with fraudulent intent, place on any article a notice of copyright or words
of the same purport that such person knows to be false,"187 or to publicly
distribute or import for distribution, with fraudulent intent, "any article
bearing such false notice or words."188 Further, Section 506(D) imposes criminal
liability on "any person who, with fraudulent intent, removes or alters any
notice of copyright appearing on a copy of a copyrighted work."189 These
sections are generally broadened by the proposed amendments, which might
be presumed to supersede current parts of Section 506.190
Because of the overlap, when Congress eventually considers the legislation,
it will be faced with the question of whether to include the new proposed
criminal liability sections or to simply amend the current Section 506 to include
the broader applications. Of course, the alternative may also be reasonable.
Repeal Section 506 and build the remaining unduplicated sections into the
proposed Section 1202. The Working Group seems to have failed to examine
the implications even within the scope of existing sections of the Copyright
Act.
Finally, there is also an inconsistency in having a criminal penalty for
violating the integrity of copyright management information without having
one for circumventing copyright protection technology.191 This inconsistency
does not make sense when considering that the circumvention of copyright
protection systems would potentially cost the copyright holder greater
financial loss than simply having the notice corrupted. If the protection is
circumvented, the work may be displayed, distributed and published, causing
financial harm to the author, whereas altering the notice would not necessarily
cause or result in copying to the author's financial disadvantage. Again, the
inconsistency seems to indicate a lack of thoroughness in the proposal and will
need attention by Congress to be corrected.
186
"Any person who violates section 1202 with intent to defraud shall be fined not
more than $500,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both." WHITE PAPER,
supra note 2, at app. 1 § 1204.
18717 U.S.C. § 106(C).
188/d.
18917 U.S.C. § 106(D).
19OSee Hearings, supra note 9, at 52 (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights and Associate Librarian for Copyright Services). Section 506, however,
does go beyond the proposed section by dealing specifically with copyright notices
which include the publication date and the representations made in an application for
copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 506.
191The only criminal penalty existing in the proposed new Section 12 is found in
Section 1204, which imposes liability only for Section 1202 violations. WHITE PAPER
supra note 2, at app. 1 § 1204; see supra note 186.
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VI. ON-LINE SERVICE PROVIDER LIABILITY - THE WHITE PAPER'S WEAKNESS
To the surprise of many, the White Paper did not introduce any
recommendations for limiting on-line service provider liability.192 There is little
denying the importance of on-line service providers in developing the NII.
Instead of recognizing the important role service providers play in providing
access to the NII, the Working Group determined that there should be no
special provision in the Copyright Act regarding on-line service provider
liability.193 The Working Group reasoned that the current law holding other
similar industries194 strictly liable should be applied to the on-line service
provider, thus holding on-line service providers strictly liable for direct
infringement.195 The choice to do nothing was not what the industry sought.
196
On-line service providers are generally considered to be different from other
service providers because of the many different types of transmissions carried
on the Nil.
At the time the White Paper was released, there were two copyright cases
pending that involved on-line service providers. 197 Within two months after
the White Paper was released, both were concluded. 198 Where the White Paper
refused to define a more limited liability position for on-line service providers,
the courts have taken on the responsibility of creating the needed definition.
192 See, WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 114-124; see also supra note 13 (definition of an
on-line service provider).
193 WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 117.
194 The White Paper draws a comparison to the photo-finishing industry. Millions of
photographs are taken to photo finishers each day by individual consumers. It is
virtually impossible for each photo finisher to review each photo he or she develops for
possible infringing or illegal material. Yet, they are held to strict liability standards. Id.
at 116.
195
"On-line service providers have a business relationship with their subscribers.
They - and, perhaps, only they - are in a position to know the identity and activities
of their subscribers and to stop unlawful activities.... Between these two relatively
innocent parties, the best policy is to hold the service provider liable." Id. at 117.
196 0n-line service providers are arguing that given the volume of material that passes
through their systems, it would be impossible for them to monitor each one. Even if it
were possible to monitor each one, it would be difficult to determine which things were
infringing or which are granted fair use. Also, the providers think that they should be
considered under similar liability as the telephone service describing themselves as a
conduit simply providing access to the Nil. See Id. at 114-116.
197Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29,
1993); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (verified first amended complaint filed March 3,1995).
198Frank Music Corp., No. 93 Civ. 8153, was settled on November 7, 1995 and an
opinion determining summary judgment and injunctive relief was reported in Religious
Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. 1361.
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A. The Netcorn Case
In Religious Technology Centers v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.
("Netcom"),199 a collection of published and unpublished works of L. Ron
Hubbard, the late founder of the Church of Scientology, were uploaded onto a
BBS and were given access to the Internet through Netcom. The plaintiff
brought an action against the uploader of the documents, Dennis Erlich
("Erlich"), 200 the bulletin board system of which he was a member ("BBS"), and
Netcom On-line Communications Services ("Netcom"), the on-line access
provider giving the BBS access to the Internet.201 The infringing material was
uploaded into a Usenet Newsgroup,202 which was distributed to other Usenet
servers throughout the world. Erlich's "initial act of posting a message to the
Usenet resulted in the automatic copying of [defendant's] message from [the
BBS] onto Netcom's computer and onto other computers on the Usenet."203
Usenet servers maintained the postings from Newsgroups for a period of
eleven days, and the BBS maintained the message for three days before deleting
them from memory.204
The court noted that Netcom was not like other on-line service providers,
such as CompuServe, America Online, and Prodigy in that Netcom did not
create or control any content of the information available to its subscribers. 205
Netcom did, however, have the ability to suspend a user's access privileges
when he or she violated one of Netcom's terms and conditions. When the
plaintiff notified both Netcom and the BBS, neither took any action claiming
that they could not shut out Erlich without shutting out all users of the BBS.206
With these facts, the court faced the issue of whether "the operator of a
computer bulletin board service ("BBS"), and the large Internet access provider
199 Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. 1361.
20 0There is little doubt that the direct uploader of the infringing material was directly
liable for copyright infringement, however, his or her liability was not a subject of the
summary judgments being considered by the court. The court's discussion considers
him/her directly liable. See generally Id. at 1372-73.
20 1The court did not use the term Nil, and, for purposes of discussion, the meaning
of the Nil and the Internet should be considered synonymous.
202 A Usenet Newsgroup is a vast linkage of thousands of bulletin boards that all share
information that is divided into thousands of various Newsgroup categories. Id. at 1365,
n.4. The Usenet is commonly accessed on and through the Internet. The Newsgroup
categories are divided topically by interest. DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 288.
203Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1367.
2041d.
20 5This distinction is relevant in the courts discussion of liability based on knowledge.
Further, this distinction may be used to analyze the CompuServe settlement which will
be discussed. See infra part VI.B.
206Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
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that allows that BBS to reach the Internet, should be liable for copyright
infringement committed by a subscriber of the BBS."
207
The court first addressed direct liability for copyright infringement. The key
issue for direct infringement was whether Netcom had knowledge that the
material was infringing. The court concluded that Netcom and the BBS were
unaware of what their subscribers did while accessing the Internet.
208 The
court likened Netcom's act of creating a system that automatically and
uniformly created temporary copies of all data sent though it as "not unlike
that of the owner of a copying machine who lets the public make copies with
it." 209
The Netcom court's decision not to hold an on-line service provider directly
liable for copyright infringement appears to be contrary to the White Paper's
recommendation. 210 The Working Group relied on Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Frena 211 concluding that the holding in Playboy was to make the BBS operator
"directly liable for the display of unauthorized copies on the services, as well
as the distribution of unauthorized copies to subscribers."
212 The White Paper
saw no reason not to hold all service providers to strict liability.
213
Instead, the court in Netcom distinguished Playboy, determining that while a
BBS operator may be directly liable for distributing or displaying public works
as in Playboy, "the storage on a defendant's system of infringing copies and
retransmission to other servers is not a direct infringement by the BBS operator
20 7Id. at 1365.
20 81d. at 1372.
The court finds that Netcom acted as a conduit and generally does not exhibit
knowledge of its subscribers activities. Id. However, in the court's discussion of
contributory infringement, it concluded that there was an issue of fact as to whether
Netcom had knowledge based on the plaintiff's letters requesting that the material be
removed from the system. Id. at 1374.
209Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. 1361,1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
210The White Paper concludes that the best policy is to hold the service provider liable.
WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 117.
The court did not see its conclusion as different from that recommended by the
White Paper, but instead saw "uncertainty regarding whether a BBS operator should be
directly liable for reproduction or distribution of files uploaded by a subscriber."
Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1373.
211Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Ha. 1993).
212WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 120; see Playboy Enters., Inc., 839 F. Supp. at 1559.
213The plaintiff in Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom presented an argument similar to
the White Paper, that strict liability was appropriate. The court, however, carried the
strict liability argument to its logical conclusion. Since Usenet messages are copied onto
thousands of Usenet computers, it would result in liability for "every single Usenet
server in the worldwide link of computers transmitting [defendant's] message to every
other computer.... There is no need to construe the Act to make all these parties
infringers." Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1369-70.
19961
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
of the exclusive right to reproduce the work where such copies are uploaded
by the infringing user."214
The plaintiff also argued that Netcom and the BBS should be held strictly
liable because they were imparted with knowledge of the infringement when
they received a letter asking that the infringing material be removed.215 The
court dismissed this argument because knowledge was not an element of direct
infringement.2 16 Knowledge could only go to show contributory
infringement.2 17
Next, the court considered contributory infringement.2 18 The court held that
Netcom and the BBS could be contributory liable if the plaintiff could prove
that Netcom had knowledge of the defendant's infringing material, because
either Netcom or the BBS could have canceled the defendant's infringing
message and thereby stopped an infringing copy from being distributed
worldwide.2 19 The ability of Netcom and the BBS to stop the message





217The White Paper fails to make the distinction that knowledge is required for strict
liability for copyright infringement. This factor may have resulted in the Working
Group's incorrect conclusion. See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 115-17.
218Contributory infringement is liability for infringement when the defendant, "with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another." Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (citing Gershwin




Whether Netcom was actually contributorily liable will never be known because
before going to trial on remand, Netcom entered into an out-of-court settlement with
Religious Technology Centers for an undisclosed amount and the case against Netcom
was concluded. Netcom, Scientologists Settle Suit Over Internet Postings, Los ANGELES
TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1996, at D2; Mark Walsh, Netcom Settlement Could Help Forge Internet IP
Policy, THE RECORDER, Aug. 6, 19%, at News, p.1. As a result, Netcom has posted a
message to its subscribers informing them of Netcom's position regarding intellectual
property on the Internet, warning that "[blefore you post that funny monologue of Dave
Barry's or that wonderful Dilbert cartoon or use that image of kermit [sic] the Frog on
your Webpage, please remember that these materials are very likely to be proprietary
and cannot be distributed without permission." Netcom On-Line Communications
Services, Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet (last modified Aug. 28, 1996)
<http://www.netcom.com/about/protectcopy.html>.
Of the two other co-defendants, the Church of Scientology settled with electronic
bulletin board service operator Tom Klemesrud for $50,000 three weeks after the
settlement with Netcom, with neither side admitting any wrongdoing. The case against
Scientology minister Dennis Erlich still remains. Dan Goodin, Scientology Case Helps
Define On-Line Liability, THE RECORDER, Aug. 26, 1996, at News, p.1.
[Vol. 44:197
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss2/6
COPYRIGHT ON THE INTERNET
The court's reliance on the knowledge of the activities of users is contrasted
with the White Paper, which relied on the ability to control to conclude that
on-line service providers should be held strictly liable.221 The White Paper
reasoned that the only ones in a position to control such infringing material are
the service providers.222 The Working Group ignored the knowledge
requirement the court relied on and used this factor to justify direct
infringement liability.223
The court then considered the possibility of vicarious liability. Vicarious
liability exists for actions of a primary infringer where the defendant- (1) has
the right and ability to control the infringer's acts; and, (2) receives a direct
financial benefit from the infringement.224 Whereas the court found that
Netcom and the BBS operator did potentially have the power to control the
infringer's acts,225 it reasoned that neither received any financial benefit from
the infringer's acts and therefore neither could be vicariously liable.226
A different conclusion is expressed in the White Paper.227 In the White Paper,
the Working Group concluded that on-line service providers benefited from
offering subscribers the ability to upload files, because that ability attracted
subscribers and usage for which they are paid. 228 The court, however, reasoned
that the on-line service providers did not benefit from the actual transmission
of the infringing material, and the ability to transmit infringing material was
not used to attract or enhance the value of the services offered.229 The court's
different conclusion of what constituted financial benefit led it to hold that an
on-line service provider that does nothing more than provide access to the
Internet cannot be vicariously liable.230
221WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 117.
222 Id.
223 Absent in the White Paper is the knowledge requirement for direct infringement,
which the court in Religious Tech. Ctr. considered fundamental. See Id.; Tech. Ctr., 907 F.
Supp. at 1373-75.
224 Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
225Netcom and the BBS demonstrated such control in their ability to cancel an
individual's access account for violating terms of the agreement between the user and
the service. Therefore, a sufficient question of fact had been raised. Id. at 1376.
22 61d. at 1377.
22 7WHrrE PAPER, supra note 2, at 117.
228Id.
229 See Kelly Tickle, Note, The Vicarious Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators of
the Copyright Infringement Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L. REV. 391, 415(1995) (arguing that BBS operators lease cyberspace and should thus be treated like
landlords, who are not liable for infringement that occurs on their premises).
23 OAgain, a distinction was made between Netcom and its competitors such as
CompuServe and America Online in that Netcom did not regulate the use of its services
as did its competitors. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1377.
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Finally, the court considered whether Netcom had a fair use defense. The
court began by pointing out that the fair use considerations should be focused
on whether Netcom's actions qualified as fair use and not on whether Erlich
himself engaged in fair use.231 Identifying the four factors to be considered to
determine fair use,232 the court concluded that the first two factors, the nature
of the copyrighted work and the amount and substantiality of the portion used,
were to be regarded in Netcom's favor, because Netcom's use of copyrighted
material served a completely different function than that of the plaintiff's.
233
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, was also
held to be in Netcom's favor because in order for Netcom to fulfill its purpose
as a Usenet provider, it had to copy the postings in their entirety.234
The fourth factor, the effect of the use on the potential market for the work,
was, however, found to be possibly in the plaintiff's favor and, therefore, an
issue to be determined by the finder of fact.235 The court found compelling the
plaintiff's evidence that although the Church currently faced no competition,
there was potential that the infringing materials could be used in the future by
the Church's competitors and therefore cause financial damage to theplaintiff.236
The court concluded that there remained questions of fact as to whether
Netcom knew, or should have known, of the infringing material from the
plaintiff's letter, whether Netcom substantially participated in the
infringement, and whether Netcom had a valid fair use defense.237 The court,
however, did find that the plaintiff's claims of direct and vicarious
infringement failed.238
231 The defendant "was not likely entitled to his own fair use defense, as his posting
contained large portions of plaintiffs' published and unpublished works quoted
verbatim with little added commentary." Id. at 1378.
23217 U.S.C. § 107; see supra part fl.B.
233 There was no commercial profit to be gained by Netcom's use of the copyrighted
work. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1379.
234 d. at 1380.
23 5Id.
23 6Groups in the past have stolen the Church's scriptures in charging for
Scientology-like religious training. See, e.g., Bridge Publications, Inc. v. Vein, 827 F. Supp.
629, 633-34 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076,1078-79
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987).
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B. The CompuServe Settlement
The Netcom court's heavy reliance on knowledge 239 by an on-line service
provider may have been the primary factor causing CompuServe to settle its
class action in Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc.240 In this case, the plaintiff,
Frank Music, alleged that copyright rights for more than 900 songs owned by
the publisher, members of the Harry Fox agency, were infringed and that
CompuServe was responsible for the alleged infringement by letting its
subscribers copy the songs without having its subscribers pay royalties to the
copyright holders.241
The settlement agreement entailed CompuServe's paying a cash settlement
of $568,000, or $500 for each song alleged to have been infringed, and required
the two parties to work together to assist CompuServe in setting up an
electronic licensing mechanism under which forum operators242 would help
arrange permission for downloading the copyrighted works.243 The initial
mechanical rate was to be $6.95 per song or download.244 This marks the first
time in which a major on-line service company has instituted a program for
obtaining permission for use of copyrighted work.
CompuServe's active efforts to recognize the rights of copyright holders who
upload information onto its system seems to recognize the distinction made by
the court in Netcom.245 CompuServe and other major on-line service providers
2391n the White Paper, the Working Group emphasizes that letting on-line service
providers escape liability because of a lack of knowledge of infringing material would
be encouraging intentional and willful ignorance on the part of the provider. WHITE
PAPER, supra note 2, at 122.
24 0Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29,
1993) (class action settlement).
24 1See CompuServe Settles Music Copyright Suit, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 8,1995, at D2;
Copyrights, Settlement Reached in Music Publishers' Class Action Against On-Line Provider,
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 8, 1995, at A216; Briefly: Technology &
Telecommunications, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at D2.
The songs were available in CompuServe's MIDI/ Music forum. CompuServe has
manyforums available to its subscribers that are divided topically by interests. In the
forums, users are encouraged to interact with other subscribers who are also members
of the forum by posting messages and uploading and downloading files which are
related to the forum's purpose. CompuServe uses system operators ("SYSOPs') to
monitor the postings in the forum, and in the case of technical support forums, to answer
technical support questions posed by members of the forum. Often, in the case of a forum
that offers technical support for a particular company, the files available will be product
enhancements and the SYSOPs will be employed by the specific manufacturer.
242Forum operators are also known as SYSOPs. See supra note 241.
243 Copyrights, Settlement Reached in Music Publishers' Class Action Against On-Line
Provider, supra note 241, at A216.
244Id.
24 5Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
The court in Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom continually emphasizes that its
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exhibit a great deal of control over the content of their services. Such knowledge
and control might make them liable for direct copyright infringement,
contributory infringement, and even vicarious infringement.246 In the end, the
liability that would be imposed would not be all that different from the strict
liability requirements that were recommended by the Working Group in the
White Paper.247 The primary distinction drawn by the court in Netcom is the
distinction between types of service providers based on the knowledge and
control they may have over the use of their system for the copying of infringing
works.248 On-line service providers will have to judge their own participation
and knowledge of subscriber activity to determine what liability they might
face.
VII. CONCLUSION
Generally, the proposals made by the White Paper are consistent with the
changes that are needed in the Copyright Act because of the NIL Unfortunately,
the White Paper suffers from narrow vision. As a result, key revisions were
omitted forcing the courts to make determinations normally left to the
legislature. This lack of completeness by the Working Group becomes even
more disappointing when coupled with the many inconsistencies and apparent
lack of adequate consideration it exhibited in several of its recommendations.
The most glaring problem with the legislation proposed in the White Paper
is the failure to address on-line service provider liability. On-line service
providers are not given guidance in their role in developing the NII. The
Working Group's conclusion that strict liability would be imposed is
unacceptable because it fails to recognize the various roles different access
providers play. While the courts appear to be going in the right direction by
recognizing that strict liability is not appropriate for some on-line service
providers, the legislature has a long way to go to assure that the Copyright Act
addresses the questions presented by the NIl.
GEORGE SMIRNOFF III
determination of liability for Netcom was largely based on the fact that Netcom exercises
little or no control over the content contributed by its subscribers, which was very unlike
other major on-line service providers such as CompuServe, America Online, and
Prodigy. Id.
246 Direct copyright infringement may result because CompuServe uses system
operators to monitor what is uploaded. Monitoring and approving what is uploaded
imparts the knowledge required for contributory infringement. Since such monitoring
services are commonly known and often advertised, there could be a financial benefit
which would impart vicarious liability.
247 See WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 114-24.
248 See Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1377,1381.
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